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1. Promoting and protecting freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
Two patterns for modern democracies. 
 
Modern Constitutional Democracies follow two basic patterns to 
protect and promote religious freedom1. We refer to these patterns as the 
“separation” model and the “cooperation” model. Both stem from the 
Western experience about religion and political power, according to which 
some degree of separation between the State and any system of beliefs is 
necessary to secure the basic conditions under which freedom of religion or 
belief may flourish openly. 
 Both, separation and cooperation, coexist in the same European 
context2. Both represent the delicate balance between liberty and equality, 
the equilibrium at stake in almost all the areas of civil liberties and with 
                                              
* This report has been developed within the Research Project “Public 
Management of Religious Pluralism” (SEJ2005-06642) sponsored by the Spanish 
Ministry of Education.  
1
 See W. Cole Durham, “Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative 
Framework”, Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective (edited by John Witte and 
Johan D. van der Vyver) vol.2 Legal Perspectives, The Hague ; London : Martinus 
Nijhoff (1996), pp. 12-24; J. Martínez-Torrón, Separatismo y Cooperación en los 
Acuerdos del Estado con las minorías religiosas, Comares, Granada (1994).  
2
 For an accurate description of the European panorama, see G. Robbers, “Diversity of 
State-Religion Relations and European Union Unity”, Ecclesiastical Law Journal, vol. 
7 issue 34 (2004), pp. 304-316- 
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significant consequences in the field of Religion and State relations3. 
Neither separation nor cooperation exist in a pure state, without 
interferences. History, religious affiliation of citizens, politics, immigration 
issues, legal tradition, economics, etc. play an important role in shaping 
their contours.   
 The separation model takes a firm stand for a minimalist concept of 
freedom of religion or belief in terms of non-coercion. Thus, the State 
leave citizens free in matters relating to religion or belief, whatever they 
may be. And simultaneously, in order to secure that freedom the State 
appeals for complete independence from religions or beliefs (freedom from 
religion) which means a sort of neutrality. This kind of model is called in 
American Constitutional Law “category neutrality”, under which the 
equality principle gains the upper hand: «[t]he purpose of the constitutional 
provision [for instance in the U.S. Establishment Clause], in this view, is to 
ensure that the government treats religious choices the same way it treats 
other categories of belief, preference, and motivation. If religious choice is 
protected, category neutrality requires that other choices —based on 
nonreligious reasons— must be given similar protection»4. Category 
neutrality implies, among other things, the same basic legal regime for 
religious and non-religious groups and entities alike, a common legal 
regulation for all beliefs (religious, philosophical, ideological views) and a 
clear preference for prima facie neutral laws in those cases in which 
conflicts arise between State law and religious norms or religious 
conscientious objections. 
 The cooperation model proclaims and recognizes religious freedom 
and maintains the separation between the State and religious or belief 
groups as well. Nevertheless, its separation (or benevolent neutrality5) is a 
soft one since this model considers religious or belief groups as instruments 
which promote the religious freedom of the citizens in many ways. Besides, 
in some cases the model recognizes that religious or belief groups (and not 
only individuals) are entitled to religious freedom themselves. Therefore, 
the State deems it important to uphold a dialogue in “legal terms” with 
religious groups. This legal dialogue is reflected in legal, not necessarily 
bilateral, instruments in a formal way (i.e. concordats or bilateral 
agreements). It is important to note that the dialogue follows “legal” paths: 
                                              
3
 Andrés Ollero, España, ¿un Estado laico? La libertad religiosa en perspectiva 
constitucional,  Thomson Civitas, Madrid (2005), p. 42. 
4
 M.W. McConnell, R.A. Posner, “An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious 
Freedom”, University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 56 (1989), p. 37. 
5
 As the U.S. Supreme Court describes it, benevolent neutrality is a middle ground 
between separation and identification, a neutrality «which will permit religious exercise 
to exist without sponsorship and without interference.» Walz v. Tax Commission of City 
of New York , 397 U.S. 664 (1970) at 669. 
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so the result of the “legal dialogue” is not a prerogative, since principles of 
“freedom” and “non-discrimination” play a fundamental role in order to 
fairly craft accommodations, legal arrangements6 or ad hoc adjustments to 
balance liberty and equality in specific situations. This model of 
cooperation promotes “incentive neutrality” to «remove governmental 
disincentives to religious choice»7 and entails, among other things, special 
secular legal personality for religious groups, specific regulations for 
religious or belief phenomena and a willingness on the part of the State law 
to carve out exceptions —through different legal tools— to accommodate 
facially neutral laws with regards to religious conscientious objections or 
religious scruples. 
 It is virtually impossible to assert which of these two systems —
separation or cooperation— is better for protecting and promoting religious 
freedom.  Like legal traditions, systems relating to religious freedom 
protection rest heavily upon many social and legal factors. As a result, we 
reach the same conclusions Professor Merryman reached in analyzing legal 
traditions: «Which is better? At one level this is a foolish question. It is like 
asking whether the French language is superior to the English language. 
Better for whom? Surely no one should suggest that the Italians would be 
better off with the common law tradition, or the Americans with the civil 
law. The law is rooted in the culture, and it responds, within cultural limits, 
to the specific demands of a given society in a given time and place. It is, at 
bottom, a historically determined process by which certain social problems 
are perceived, formulated, and resolved. Substitution of one legal tradition 
for another is neither possible nor desirable»8. This is probably why the 
Treaty establishing a European Constitution shows respect towards the 
status of religious groups (which is part of the framework of freedom of 
religion or belief)9 in each Member State. 
                                              
6
 See for instance A. Rosen-Zvi, “Freedom of Religion: The Israeli Experience”, 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1986) 46/2, pp. 213-
248. 
7
 M.W. McConnell, R.A. Posner, “An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious 
Freedom”, cit.(footnote 4), p. 37. 
8
 J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition.- An Introduction to the Legal System of 
Western Europe and Latin America  (2nd edition), Stanford University Press (1985), p. 
149.  
9
 Article I-52  Status of churches and non-confessional organisations.  
1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of 
churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States.  
2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of philosophical and 
non-confessional organisations.  
3. Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall 
maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and 
organisations.  
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 However, we have several hints as to how to address from an 
abstract perspective on the conditions under which one system functions 
better than the other. The separation system works better in those countries 
in which pluralism is limited to a single religious trend in which 
“believers” and “non-believers” try to live within the same society in 
continuous and creative liberty/equality arrangement machinery.  Besides, 
in those countries in which governmental legal intervention in society is 
low-dense, the separation system guarantees a fair treatment of all religious 
or belief groups on behalf of the State. On the contrary, the cooperation 
system could serve better to protect religious freedom effectively in those 
countries with a heterogeneous religious composition, with transitional 
periods from religious persecution/establishment of religion to 
comprehensible and equal religious freedom recognition, and in those 
developed countries which meet the characteristics of  a performance State 
with increasing governmental intervention in civil society10, since «as 
regulations proliferate, there is increased demand for exceptions that can 
sensitively accommodate religious needs. In the last analysis, if 
accommodation can be achieved without undue difficulty, a regime which 
fails to accommodate manifests a lesser degree of religious liberty»11. 
 I think it is possible to understand the Draft Treaty between the 
Slovak Republic and the Holy See on the Right to Objection of Conscience 
in this context of cooperation and benevolent neutrality12. In order to gain a 
better understanding of the Draft Agreement, the following section will be 
devoted to modern concordats and their role in religion freedom issues.   
 
3.-Concordats and agreements with religious groups revisited. 
 
The Catholic Church has preserved an enduring tradition according 
to which She resolves conflicts and confrontations with the Secular powers 
—and settles what is known as res mixtae— through what it is commonly 
called concordats. 
                                              
10
 A. Motilla, “Notas sobre problemas fundamentales del derecho eclesiástico 
contemporáneo”, Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, vol. V (1989), p. 214. 
11
 W. Cole Durham, “Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework”, 
cit. (footnote 1), p. 24. 
12
 For further information about the Slovakian system, see U. S. Department of State, 
“Slovak Republic”, International Religious Freedom [on line] [ref. 05.06.2006], 
available in web <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51580.htm>; M. Moravčíková, 
“Relationship Between the State and Churches in the Slovak Republic”, The 
International Center for Law and Religion Studies, The 1981 U.N. Declaration on 
Religious Tolerance and Non-Discrimination: Implementing Its Principles after 
Twenty-five Years (proceeding of the Symposium), [on line] [ref. 05.06.2006], available 
in web <http://www.iclrs.org/papers/Moravcikova%20English.pdf>.  
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Concordat could be described as a legal rule of a written text, divided 
into clauses or articles, signed by two international sovereign subjects13 
(one of which is the Holy See on behalf of the Catholic Church), as a 
bilateral compact14. This is a broad notion of concordat, embracing not only 
general agreements dealing with all the aspects of Church life, but also 
concise instruments concerning specific affairs, whatever the nomen iuris 
(convention, agreement, modus vivendi, protocol) may be. 
The earliest concordats meant a peaceful settlement between the 
Pontifical power and the Secular one. They mixed secular and religious 
matters, since the Pope enjoyed political-secular power as well. These 
initial concordats reflected (and this characteristic is still in force)15 the 
lasting Church effort to prevent secular intervention from impinging on the 
Church´s freedom (libertas ecclesiae). In this sense, concordats and the 
“freedom of the Church” have been «a check on the pretensions of State 
power for centuries, whether that be the power of feudal lords, absolutist 
monarchs, or the modern secular State. Where the Church retains the 
capacity to order its life and ministry according to its own criteria, to 
preach the gospel, and to offer various ministries of charity to the wider 
society, that very fact constitutes an antitotalitarian or, to put it positively, a 
pluralist principle in society. According to that principle, there are spheres 
of conviction and action where State power does not, or ought not to try to, 
reach. However confusedly the various popes may have sought to assert 
this principle theologically or to secure it practically, the fact remains that 
the libertas ecclesiae was a crucial factor in creating the social space in 
which other free institutions could form over the centuries»16. 
It may be argued that concordats promote a privileged position 
before the State, unavailable to other Religious communities. This may 
have been be the case concerning concordats signed before the Twentieth 
Century, but currently this aim has changed completely. The change is due 
in part to the new direction that the Second Vatican Council gave to 
Church-State relationships. According to the Council Declaration 
Dignitatis Humanae, the Church requests from States «freedom for herself 
in her character as a spiritual authority, established by Christ the Lord, 
upon which there rests, by divine mandate, the duty of going out into the 
whole world and of preaching the Gospel to every creature. The Church 
                                              
13
 Concerning the international legal ability of the Holy See, G.R. Watson, “Progress for 
Pilgrims? An Analysis of the Holy See-Israel Fundamental Agreement”, Catholic 
University Law Review 47 (1998), 499-506.  
14
 J.T. Martín de Agar, Raccolta di Concordati 1950-1999, Editrice Vaticana, Città del 
Vaticano 2000, p. 26. 
15
 R. Minnerath, “The Position of the Catholic Church Regarding Concordats from a 
Doctrinal and Pragmatic Perspective”, Catholic University Law Review 47 (1998) 468. 
16
 G. Weigel, “Papacy and Power”, First Things, n. 110 (February 2001), p. 20. 
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also claims freedom for herself in her character as a society of men who 
have the right to live in society in accordance with the precepts of the 
Christian faith»17, being aware that «where the principle of religious 
freedom is not only proclaimed in words or simply incorporated in law but 
also given sincere and practical application, there the Church succeeds in 
achieving a stable situation of right as well as of fact and the independence 
which is necessary for the fulfillment of her divine mission.» 18  
According to authoritative opinions19, the latter assertion would lead 
to a new situation in which bilateral agreements between the Catholic 
Church and the democratic States (in which religious freedom is 
recognized) were no longer necessary. Instead of those agreements, 
unilateral legislation would be enough to protect religious communities’ 
legal needs.  
But, in spite of abandoning these agreements, the Catholic Church 
still persists in producing new legal ties with different democratic States. 
And it is important to note that a significant part of these new compacts 
were signed with non-Christian countries20. 
Let us summarize the two previous ideas. The Catholic Church 
requests from the States for herself only this: freedom for accomplishing 
her mission in the World. To achieve this aim, unilateral legislation from 
the States might be enough since the State law could guarantee per se 
freedom of religion or belief. At the same time, however, in recent years 
we have witnessed an increasing number of concordats (more than sixty 
conventions of various titles with more than twenty-seven different 
countries!). Is there any legal explanation for this paradox? From my point 
of view, there is no paradox at all. The reason for maintaining the 
concordatarian practice is twofold: (i) sometimes democratic States do not 
completely religious freedom (especially those States which started the 
democratic experience recently), or cannot adequately determine religious 
needs; (ii) concordats work in the same way as unilateral legislation on 
                                              
17
 Declaration on Religious Freedom Dignitatis Humanae on the Right of the Person 
and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious, Promulgated by 
His Holiness Pope Paul VI on December 7, 1965, n. 5. Original text in AAS 58 (1966), 
929-946, n. 13. 
18
 Ibidem. 
19
 P.A. D´Avack, “La Chiesa e lo Stato nella nuova impostazione conciliare”, Atti del 
Congresso Internazionale di Diritto Canonico “La Chiesa Doppo il Concilio”, Milano 
1972, 351-380. 
20
 Let us understand under this term (non-Christian countries) those States and 
Governments without a Christian historical tradition. For an account of these and other 
agreements, see R. Astorri, “Gli Accordi concordatari durante il pontificato di Giovanni 
Paolo II. Verso un nuevo modello?”, en Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica, 
1/1999, pp. 23-36. 
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religious freedom, going even beyond that legislation. In other words, 
concordats themselves promote religious freedom. 
The role of concordats promoting religious freedom has two different 
stages.  
In their inner or internal stage, concordats report patterns of actions 
connected with the religious freedom of individuals and communities. For 
instance, Article 7 of the concordat with the Republic of Kazakhstan21 
establishes the following: 
 
“The Republic of Kazakhstan in conformity with its national 
legislation shall give the Catholic Church the possibility of acquiring 
through ownership or lease, corresponding to the needs of the Church, 
buildings and plots of land for the construction of the buildings necessary 
for the pastoral service of the Church, such as Churches, parish houses, 
houses of residences for the performance of religious, sociocultural, 
catechetical, educational and charitable activities” 
 
With this wording, the concordat offers a different formulation of the 
right contained in the “Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief”, Proclaimed 
by General Assembly resolution 36/55 of November 25, 1981, Article 622: 
 
“In accordance with article I of the present Declaration, and subject 
to the provisions of article 1, paragraph 3, the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion or belief shall include, inter alia, the following 
freedoms:  
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, 
and to establish and maintain places for these purposes […]” (emphasis 
added) 
 
 Article 12 of the concordat with the Polish Republic of 1993 
provides23: 
 
 “1. Riconoscendo il diritto dei genitori all´educazione religiosa dei 
figli e il principio della tolleranza, lo Stato garantisce che le scuole 
pubbliche elementari e medie, nonché i centri prescolastici, gestiti dagli 
organismi dell´amministrazione civile o autogestiti, organizzino, in 
                                              
21
 J.T. Martín de Agar, Raccolta di Concordati 1950-1999, cit. (footnote 14), p. 613. 
22
 R. Navarro-Valls, R. Palomino, Estado y Religión.- Textos para una reflexión crítica, 
Madrid 2000, 192-196.  
23
 J.T. Martín de Agar, Raccolta di Concordati 1950-1999, , cit.(footnote 14), p. 689 
(official Italian version). 
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conformità alla volontà degli interessati, l´insegnamento della religione nel 
quadro del relativo programma di scuola o prescolastico”  
 
With this phrasing, the text repeats part of Article 5 of the 
“Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief”, adopting its meaning to the 
specific situation the Parties are deciding on: 
 
“1. The parents or, as the case may be, the legal guardians of the 
child have the right to organize the life within the family in accordance 
with their religion or belief and bearing in mind the moral education in 
which they believe the child should be brought up.”   
 
 The inner or internal stage of concordats promotes specific aspects of 
religious freedom, according to the particular circumstances of each 
agreement. Each concordat in which religious freedom is specifically 
regulated transposes into legal terms a religious and secular understanding 
of religious freedom, making it possible for government agencies and to 
non-religious officials (e.g. judges, etc.), to recognize in the legal text a 
legal and secular translation of religious conduct. 
At the same time, concordats contribute to some extent to the system 
of relationships between religious groups and the State. This is what I call 
the external stage, in which concordats contribute to the religious freedom 
of other religious groups and communities. The Catholic Church has played 
a significant role in forging the cooperation system24. As a result, the State 
supports religious groups in several topics (e.g. education, tax matters, 
direct funding) and removes obstacles which hinder the action of religious 
groups in other matters (e.g. chaplainry in hospitals or prisons). Frequently 
Governments use legal agreements (as in Spain, Italy and Portugal) to put 
this co-operation into effect. It often happens that these legal agreements 
follow the structure and content of the concordats (this is very apparent in 
the Spanish case). Recently, scholars have pointed out that agreements with 
religious groups could be particularly useful in four situations. First, in the 
implementation of religious freedom in countries with no written 
Constitution, or where the Constitution does not adequately religious 
freedom, if these agreements include a minimum religious rights 
                                              
24
 W.C. Durham, “Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework”, 
Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective.- Legal Perspectives, cit.(footnote 1), p. 
20-21. For a comparative analysis of co-operationist regimes in Spain and Italy, see J. 
Martínez-Torrón, Separatismo y Cooperación en los Acuerdos del Estado con las 
minorías religiosas, cit. (footnote 1). 
© 2006 Rafael Palomino 9 
description25; second, in the solution of problems related to the position of 
the respective religious communities in the absence of a general treaty on 
religious rights; third, in the effective fulfillment of the 1992 U.N. 
“Declaration on Minorities” (especially concerning the obligations of the 
States)26; and fourth, in preventing and solving situations in which both the 
State and the religious groups foresee future religious conscientious 
objections or religious scruples that oppose facially neutral laws or State 
laws and regulations in general. 
  
3. - The role of formal bilateral agreements to protect liberty: State bilateral 
regulations as “containers” of future religious conscientious objections 
 
 The Welfare State has developed specific features concerning 
legislation which might be summarized as follows: i) speedy processes of 
implementation and abrogation, ii) “motorized” regulations (i.e. a complex 
legal system with many different types of legal instruments centred in 
several different specific cases and situations, displacing the former role of 
private contracts), iii) micro-systems of regulation for specific problems, 
situations or groups and iv) implementation of laws and regulations 
stemming from a previous process of negotiation with citizens, unions, 
companies, associations, groups, etc27.   
 In this context it makes sense to envisage that a particular sector of 
social activity, the religious or belief social area among others, could be 
regulated by the State in those issues with a significant legal dimension. 
This is a particularly common trend throughout all of Europe according to 
which “[A] religious sub-sector is singled out within the public sector. This 
may be understood as a `playing field´ or `protected arena´”28. 
 Parallel to this characteristic feature of a special legal sector, it 
creates the problem of how to deal in legal terms with conscientious 
objection: lawyers still wonder themselves and ask the legal system how to 
                                              
25
 S. Ferrari, “The Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and Israel and the 
Conventions Between States and the Church since the Vatican II Council”, Catholic 
University Law Review 47 (1998), p. 406. 
26
 For the content and implications of this Declaration, N. Lerner, “The 1992 UN 
Declaration on Minorities", Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, vol. 23 (1994), p. 111-
128.  
27
 A. Motilla, “Notas sobre problemas fundamentales del Derecho Eclesiástico 
contemporáneo”, Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, vol. V (1989), p. 218. 
28
 S. Ferrari, “The New Wine and the Old Cask. Tolerance, Religion and the Law in 
Contemporary Europe”, Ratio Iuris, vol. 10 n. 1 (1997), p. 77. 
© 2006 Rafael Palomino 10 
manage conscientious objection in a consistent fashion with its specific 
nature29.  
 It is important to remember that conscientious objection is the 
refusal, due to conscientious scruples of different sources (philosophical, 
religious, etc), to perform certain acts which the State law or regulations 
compel us to perform30. Conscientious objection is the radical outcome of 
the freedom of a human being to act according to her/his inner dictates. 
That is why some scholars describe conscientious objection as a “right to 
refuse a legal duty in the name of individual conscience”31. “[A] minimum 
standard for conscientious objection is belief that one should submit to 
penalties that society (or any decent society) has deemed appropriate rather 
than perform the obligation. In other words, a true conscientious objector 
must think it would be morally preferable not to perform a required act 
even if no exemption were afforded for conscientious objectors and 
enforcement against him were certain”32. And, according to the historical 
experience, conscientious objectors do not seek radical changes in the law 
or the government (since conscientious objection is not civil disobedience) 
or serious social turmoil (conscientious objection by definition implies 
inactivity, a “not-to act”, with a low degree of social danger33). 
 Several legal systems and scholars address legislation as the basic 
tool to deal with conscientious objection. According to them only 
conscientious objection secundum legem (i.e. conscientious objection with 
prior legal regulation) should be recognized and protected. Other countries 
and scholars maintain that the judiciary in its role of guardian and keeper of 
constitutional rights may properly protect conscientious objection. This 
may be true, especially in those cases which occur more frequent than it 
seems at first glance in which conscientious objection is exercised by 
minorities. In any case, everybody agrees that conscientious objection is 
not a general right. Conscientious objection is limited to specific duties and 
                                              
29
 For an in-depth analysis see R. Navarro-Valls, J. Martínez-Torrón, Le obiezioni di 
coscienza.- Profili di Diritto Comparato, Giapichelli editore, Torino (1995), pp. 23-37. 
30
 This definition does not differ very much from the definition of the Draft Treaty 
between the Slovak Republic and the Holy See: Article 3 (5). For the purposes of this 
Treaty, "objection of conscience" means an objection raised in conformity with the 
principle of the freedom of conscience according to which anyone may refuse to act in a 
manner that he deems incompatible in his conscience with the teaching of faith and 
morals. 
31
 J. Sousa de Brito, “Conscientious Objection”, Facilitating Freedom of Religion or 
Belief: A Deskbook (T. Lindholm, W. Cole Durham, B. G. Tahzib editors), Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (2004), p. 273.  
32
 K. Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality, Oxford University Press (1987), p. 
313. 
33
 F. Onida, “Contributo a un inquadramento giuridico del fenomeno delle obiezioni di 
coscienza”, en Il diritto ecclesiastico, 1982, p. 229. 
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issues. Otherwise conscientious objection would mean the denial of the 
fundamental nature of the State34. This is the reason to reject some sort of a 
general “Code of Conscience” to regulate the different forms of 
conscientious objection35. 
 Conscientious objection and bilateral agreements, or legislation with 
previous negotiation, could complement each other for a successful legal 
solution. The explanation for this is as follows: Each bilateral agreement —
or legislation with previous negotiation— requires a previous formal and 
official dialogue between the State and a given religious or belief group. In 
this dialogue, the State becomes fully aware of those specific problems, 
conflicts and scruples its legislation creates for members of a religious or 
belief group. And through dialogue and final agreement the State and the 
religious group establish a legal path to avoid those conflicts, balancing the 
State interest with the freedom of conscience of the believer. The aim of 
the agreement —or legislation with previous negotiation— is not 
necessarily to restrain State power and regulation (a regulation that 
supposedly endangers human rights), but rather to establish one possible 
route for cooperation. The legislator acquires detailed information to find 
out the specific needs of religious conscience in order to avoid, if feasible, 
a clash between State law and religious conscience, and then facilitating for 
the citizens the free compliance with their duties of conscience36. In sum, 
this kind of agreement functions as a big “container” to protect effectively, 
and legally, religious conscientious objection. 
  This idea is not as new as it may seem. For instance, it clearly 
applies to a specific problem which is normally regulated in agreed legal 
instruments: the protection of religious communications37. The immense 
                                              
34
 As the Spanish Constitutional Court puts it, “Se trata, ciertamente, como se acaba de 
decir, de un derecho que supone la concreción de la libertad ideológica (…) Pero de ello 
no puede deducirse que nos encontremos ante una pura y simple aplicación de dicha 
libertad. La objeción de conciencia con carácter general, es decir, el derecho a ser 
eximido del cumplimiento de los deberes constitucionales o legales por resultar ese 
cumplimiento contrario a las propias convicciones, no está reconocido ni cabe imaginar 
que lo estuviera en nuestro Derecho o en Derecho alguno, pues significaría la negación 
misma de la idea del Estado”. STC núm. 161/1987 (Pleno), de 27 octubre, Fundamento 
Jurídico n. 3. 
35
 See R. Navarro-Valls, R. Palomino, “Las objeciones de conciencia”, en Tratado de 
Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, Eunsa, Pamplona (1994), p. 1089. 
36
 D. Llamazares Fernández, “Prólogo”, en A. Fernández-Coronado, Estado y 
Confesiones Religiosas: Un nuevo modelo de relación, Civitas, Madrid (1995), p. 19. 
37
 Article 8 of the Basic Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Holy See, 
November 24, 2000, AAS (2001) 136-155: 1. Il segreto confessionale é inviolabile. 
L’invioiabihtá del segreto confessionale comprende il diritto di rifiutare la deposizione 
davanti agli organi statali della Repubblica Slovacca. 2. La Repubblica Slovacca 
garantisce anche l’inviolabilità del segreto d’informazione, affidato oralmente o per 
iscritto sotto la condizione di riservatezza alla persona incaricata della cura pastorale. 
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majority of democratic States legally protect the secret of religious 
communications. They do this after a process of legal dialogue and 
agreement with religious groups38, or in some cases after situations of 
systematic and/or unintended violations of freedom of conscience39. And 
this fact reveals that secular States, in one way or another, adopt special 
regulations regarding a specific topic for the sake of protecting freedom of 
conscience. 
 And this is why the Draft Treaty between the Slovak Republic and 
the Holy See on the Right to Objection of Conscience is an interesting legal 
tool, because it shows in its radical cleanliness the very purpose of State-
religious groups agreements in a modern democratic secular country, and 
because it demonstrate the basic purpose that justifies this sort of legal 
instruments in which liberty and equality blend together in a creative 
fashion. 
 
4.- The “umbrella” for conscientious objectors and the role of a religious 
group in protecting conscientious objection. 
 
Some remarks here may help shed some light on the legal 
implications of the Draft Agreement. 
 The Draft Agreement is not a blank-cheque mechanism to avoid the 
law. Not every potential conflict between religious norms and State law 
becomes a real conflict of law and morality. It would be naïve to think that 
each and every catholic Slovakian citizen will hide him/herself under the 
Draft Agreement to evade conscience scruples. Thinking in this manner 
would be to misunderstand what conscientious objection really is. It also 
                                                                                                                                    
With a different wording, Article II.3. of the Agreement of  July 28, 1976, between the 
Holy See and the Kingdom of Spain:  In no case may a clergyman or member of a 
religious order be enjoined by Judges or other Authorities to give information 
concerning persons or subjects that they may have obtained in the course of their 
ministry (English text from Spanish Legislation on Religious Affairs [A. de la Hera, 
R.M. Martínez de Codes, editors], Ministerio de Justicia, Madrid [1998], p. 49).  
38
 Article 3. 2 of the Agreement of Cooperation Between the State and the Federation of 
Evangelical Religious Entities of Spain: Those ministers of Churches belonging to the 
FEREDE are not obliged lo divulge information revealed to them in the exercise of 
their duties of worship or religious assistance. (English text from Spanish Legislation 
on Religious Affairs, cit.(footnote 37), p. 79). 
39
 On this topic see M.S. Ariens, R.A. Destro, Religious Liberty in a Pluralistic Society, 
Carolina Academic Press, North Carolina (1996), pp. 927-938, which reflects somehow 
the ability for unilateral accommodations adopted before judicial experience on the 
topic. OSCE/ODHIR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief in 
consultation with the European Commission for Democracy through Law, Guidelines 
for Review of Legislation pertaining to Religion or Belief [on line] [ref. 02.06.2006] 
available in web http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2004/09/12361_142_en.pdf, p. 
16.  
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implies a prejudice against believers: they might be considered implicitly 
as “machines” of blind-obedience… The State, however, must avoid this 
kind of implicit judgement or else the State would be discriminating against 
a group of citizens because of their beliefs.  
It is important to note as well that religion does not always provide a 
pre-defined basis from which to assess the right to manifest a belief40. It 
would be even be reasonable to say that in many cases religion is basically 
a source of inspiration for further reflexion41. “In the narrowest sense, one 
might say that a genuine conflict between law and morality exists only 
when, after all claims have been properly weighed, moral reasons require 
action that is contrary to what the law demands”42. For some catholic 
citizens, there would probably be no conscience problems at all, despite the 
official Catholic teachings; for the Church, they would be sinners, but for 
the State this qualification as sinners or outcasts is not necessarily relevant. 
For other catholic citizens, it might be more advantageous to obey the law 
of the State or to perform certain de-criminalized acts (i.e. performing 
abortions using the health-care system in order to maintain one´s job or 
particular position without any kind of civil disability, co-operating in 
euthanasia, concluding on behalf of the State same-sex union, etc.) than to 
follow the dictates of conscience. Finally, for other Catholic citizens, there 
might be a real conflict between certain acts which the law requires and 
their conscience, according to the religious teachings of the Catholic 
Church. And in this later case, it is important to stress that these kinds of 
conscientious scruples would exist with or without an Agreement. And it is 
similarly important for a democratic State to take into serious consideration 
this conscientious scruples with or without an Agreement. Otherwise, 
democratic States would be recognizing a freedom of conscience without a 
real and significant meaning. 
 Viewing the situation from this perspective, what is the role of the 
Agreement in this and other cases? 
 As we have seen earlier, agreements between religious groups and 
the State are “containers” of conscientious objection in order to prevent and 
solve future conflictive situations. The Agreement is only a lighthouse that 
                                              
40
 L. M. Hammer, The International Human Right to Freedom of Conscience.- Some 
Suggestions for its Development and Application, Ashgate, Darmouth (2001), p. 159. 
41
 Ibid. p. 160. Recently English Courts faced a case of this pattern: Shabina Begum´s 
religion does not establish jilbab dress as mandatory; however Shabina considered 
jilbab more consistent with their convictions as a Muslim teenager.  See R (on the 
application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) (Respondent) v. Headteacher 
and Governors of Denbigh High School (Appellants), [2006] UKHL 15; R (Shabina 
Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School ([2005] EWCA Civ 199; [2005] 2 All ER 
396). 
42
 K. Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality, cit. (footnote 32), p. 26. 
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guides the State law in the unpredictable sea of a pluralistic society. The 
Agreement indicates for the State some external indicia related to the 
sincerity or consistency of the conscientious objector’ s conduct. Let us 
consider, for instance, conscientious objection to military service or 
conscription: “[W]ere an exemption cast in other religious terms, religious 
ties might still be used as evidence of sincerity and as a means of 
constructing the views of inarticulate claimants”43.  
 From a different perspective, scholars point out that “demonstrating 
one’s sincerity towards personal moral beliefs is quite difficult. The 
problem is that due to the subjective nature of a conscientious belief, one 
may have to demonstrate sincerity by bearing the negative consequences of 
an action that the believer took to avoid a breach of conscientious belief. 
Such a test then creates a tautology since it undermines the very freedom 
that one is striving to protect by forcing and individual to demonstrate their 
sincerity”44. 
 One may wonder whether this “sincerity evidentiary” function of 
certain religions is discriminatory towards those religions or beliefs which 
do not enjoy an Agreement. It couldn’t necessarily be the case. Since the 
right to religious conscientious objection is not grounded in the Draft 
Agreement itself, but in the Slovakian Constitution of 199245, any citizen 
could invoke conscientious objection, not only in the field of military 
service ((which is nor longer compulsory)46 regulated in Article 25 of the 
Slovakian Constitution47, but in other fields akin to those regulated in the 
Draft Agreement. 
 
5.- Concluding remarks 
  
                                              
43
 Ibid. P. 321-322. 
44
 L. M. Hammer, The International Human Right to Freedom of Conscience.- Some 
Suggestions for its Development and Application, cit. (footnote 40), p. 155. See also M. 
Walzer, Tratado sobre la tolerancia, Paidos, Barcelona (1998), p. 81. 
45
 A r t i c l e 24 (1) Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and faith shall be 
guaranteed. This right shall include the right to change religion or faith and the right to 
refrain from a religious affiliation. Every person shall be entitled to express his or her 
opinion publicly. 
46
 See War Resisters' International, Slovakia: Refusing to Bear Arms 2005 revision, [on 
line], [ref. 05.06.2006], available in web <http://www.wri-irg.org/co/rtba/slovakia.htm>. 
And CIA World Factbook, Slovakia (military service age and obligation), [on line], [ref. 
05.06.2006], available in web 
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/lo.html#Military>. 
47
 A r t i c l e 25.  (1) The defence of the Slovak Republic is the honourable privilege 
and duty of every citizen. (2) No person may be forced to perform military duties if it is 
contrary to his or her conscience or religious faith or conviction. Further details shall be 
specified by law. 
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 According to the considerations above, the Draft Agreement 
promotes freedom of religion or belief in a cooperative legal environment 
like the Slovakian one. It offers valid mechanisms to set up a regulatory 
system for religious conscientious objection. It doesn’t create a blank-
cheque for disobeying the law, but a very valuable hint for the State law to 
find out the religious scruples and conscientious needs of the citizenry. As 
far as I know, it is a unique Agreement due to these specific features. Once 
enforced, if it happens, it will be a very interesting legal tool to protect 
freedom of conscience and to prevent conflicts. I am sure that legal 
scholars will follow the potential implementation with real interest. 
